Donnerstag, 14. Dezember 2017, 17:00 - 19:00 iCal

Thick Moral Ignorance

Brian Weatherson

Hörsaal 3B, 3. Stock
Universitätsstrasse 7, 1010 Wien


I've argued that people are not to blame for harms they cause due to reasonable mistake about factual questions, but they are to blame for harms they cause due to reasonable mistakes about normative questions. This pair of views faces an obvious challenge in saying something about in between cases. What should we say about someone who causes harm because of a reasonable mistake about what is required by justice, or fairness, or courage, or friendship? More generally, what should we say about harm caused by mistakes about thick moral concepts. I'll argue that we need to proceed case by case here, but in many cases these kinds of mistakes are not excusing


Institut für Philosophie


Alexandra Klot-Heydenfeldt
Organisationsassistenz Univ.-Prof. Kölbel